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4.1.  Introduction: Overview of Household Savings 
This paper is the first of two that report on household saving in Germany. 
This paper concentrates on incentives for saving; the second paper will provide 
an analysis of the composition of household savings and the factors that influ- 
ence it. 
Germans are said to value saving per se, by tradition. They were reluctant to 
follow American consumerism despite strong American influence on German 
postwar development. Although this attitude appears to be changing with each 
new generation, it does so surprisingly slowly. Table 4.1 presents comparable 
personal savings rates for Germany and the United States. It shows that, since 
1960, savings rates have always been higher in Germany than in the United 
States but that this discrepancy is particularly large in recent years. Although 
savings rates in both countries have declined since 1975, the relative decline is 
much smaller in Germany than in the United States. 
The different historical experiences of Germans and Americans may help to 
explain the higher aggregate savings rates that emerged in Germany as soon as 
a moderate standard of living was achieved in the 1960s. The elderly in the 
decade 1982-92  have all experienced World War 11. This catastrophe, however, 
affected Americans and Germans very differently. During wartime and until 
the German currency reform in  1948, most Germans could not even satisfy 
such basic needs as food and clothing, an experience not shared by their Amer- 
ican contemporaries. In addition, during the so-called economic miracle in the 
Axel Borsch-Supan is professor of economics at the University of Mannheim, a research associ- 
ate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a research fellow of the Centre for Eco- 
nomic Policy Research. 
The author thanks Karl-Heinz NohrbaR, Wolfram Richter, and Volker Ulrich for most valuable 
comments. Matthias Meier and Bernhard Boockmann provided able research assistance. 
81 82  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 4.1  Aggregate Savings Rates (personal savings as % of personal 
disposable income) 
Year  West Germany  United States 
1960  8.6  5.7 
1965  12.2  7.0 
1970  13.8  8.0 
I975  16.2  8.7 
1980  14.2  7.9 
1985  13.0  6.4 
1990  14.8  5.1 
Source: Monatsberichte  der Deutschen Bundesbank (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank, 
1992); Economic Report of  the President, Statistical Appendix (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1992). 
1950s in Germany, saving was heavily promoted  in large-scale public cam- 
paigns. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 report on how these large savings are invested. The tables 
are based  on two very different surveys: table 4.2 is based on the German 
Income and Expenditure survey, which excludes the very rich';  table 4.3 is 
based on property tax returns, which need only be filed by the very wealthy, 
due to the large exclusions. On average, about 70 percent of  net household 
wealth is held in real estate, as is evident from the last column in table 4.2. 
Another 10  percent is invested in company shares and the remaining 20 percent 
in  financial  assets.  However, portfolio choice varies  greatly  with  the  total 
amount of  wealth available. Company shares and bonds are preferred by the 
rich, while the less wealthy prefer general savings accounts. According to table 
4.3, more than 70 percent of  all company shares and almost 60 percent of all 
stocks and bonds are held by the wealthiest  1 percent of households in Ger- 
many. Real estate, however, is much more equally distributed. 
The attitude that saving is good per se (and that personal loans are to  be 
avoided) is reflected in the German tax treatment of savings and loans. Al- 
though all income is nominally taxed equally, the taxation of interest income 
and capital gains is only half-heartedly enforced. In addition, there are several 
schemes subsidizing savings in Germany, many of them heavily advertised. A 
description of these incentives is the main topic of this paper. 
Section 4.2 will detail the taxation of capital income in Germany. Section 
4.3 is devoted to a discussion of property taxes. Because this paper is con- 
cerned with tax incentives to household saving, we concentrate on personal 
taxation and largely ignore the taxation of corporations. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 
describe the  incentives  for retirement  and precautionary  saving in  relation 
to pension provisions  and health and unemployment  insurance.  Section 4.6 
I. Households with net incomes exceeding DM 250,000 per annum (US.  $156,000) Table 4.2  Distribution and Composition of Household Wealth (based on the 1973 Income and Expenditure Survey) 
Average Net Household Wealth (DM) 
Total Net  1 to  5,000 to  10,000 to  20,000 to  35,000 to  100,000 to  500,000 to  1,000,000 and  All 






































































































































Source: Mierheim and Wicke (1978). 
Note: Excludes households with annual incomes above DM 250,000 ($156,000 U.S.). 84  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 4.3  Distribution and Composition of Household Wealth among the Very 
Rich (based on 1980 property tax returns) 
Average Household Wealth of  Top x % (thousand DM) 
and 
% of Total Wealth Held by Top x % 
Agricultural  Real  Company  Stocks  Gross  Net 
x  Property  Estate  Shares  and Bonds  Other  Wealth  Debt  Wealth 
0.5  12  1,240  1,522  44  1  537  3,754  379  3,374 
3.6  13.2  61.8  50.7  6.1  17.2  12.0  8.1 
5.2  19.1  71.3  57.9  8.1  21.9  15.5  23.0 
6.4  23.1  76.2  61.8  9.5  24.9  17.6  26.1 
1 .0  9  894  877  25 1  355  2,389  243  2,146 
1.5  7  72  1  624  179  278  1,811  184  1,627 
Source: Baron (1988, 188). 
Nore; Excludes households with wealth below property tax exclusion. Property tax considered is 
the Vermogensteuer in section 4.3.1. 
examines special incentive programs for saving in Germany, in particular the 
Vermogensbildungsgesetz,  a wealth accumulation program for the lower mid- 
dle class that has existed since 1961. Section 4.7 concludes and delivers a sum- 
mary of  the programs and their associated expenditures from 1975 to  1990. 
We  will refer to this summary (table 4.11) throughout the paper. 
4.2.  Taxation of Capital Income 
The basic principle of German personal income taxation is that all income 
of German residents-wherever  and however earned-is  taxed equally. There- 
fore, the original intention of the German legislature was to provide no special 
provisions for capital income taxation and to avoid any distortions related to 
differential taxation. All asset income is supposed to be taxed as ordinary in- 
come. This includes capital gains: Germany does not have a capital gains tax 
like the one in the United States, and there is no distinction in  statutory tax 
rates among different income sources like the different Massachusetts state 
income tax rates. Moreover, Germany has only a federal income tax, with no 
state or local income taxes that can create additional regional distortions.2 
Reality, however, deviates from this principle. Effective tax rates differ be- 
tween various income sources, not because of  differential statutory tax rates 
but because of differential valuation methods, differential exclusion rules, and 
differential enforcement of ta~ation.~ 
2. However, property taxes are regional or local, see sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
3. Summaries of the Gennan tax system can be found in Petersen (1988) and Stiglitz and Schon- 
felder (1989). 8.5  Savings in Germany-Part  1: Incentives 
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Fig. 4.1  Marginal personal income tax rates before and after German tax reform 
Source: Einkornrnensteuergesetz  (various issues). 
Note: EST 81 refers to the Einkommensfeuergesefz  (1981). i.e., the German personal income tax 
code in 1981. The notation is analogous in 1986, 1988, and 1990, when the three steps of the tax 
reform took place. 
The German federal income tax code has a single tax  schedule defined 
piecewise by polynomials. The polynomials are stated in the law as mathemati- 
cal formulae. Germans do not use the notion of “tax brackets,” although three 
pieces of the schedule can be distinguished: two proportional zones and a pro- 
gressive zone. Until 1989, the basic structure consisted of a constant marginal 
tax rate of 22 percent for low incomes, then a degree-four polynomial for mid- 
dle incomes, and finally a top marginal tax rate of 56 percent for high incomes. 
All three pieces were smoothly tied together. The 1990 tax reform reduced the 
marginal tax rates and flattened the so-called middle-class belly by  replacing 
it with a quadratic polynomial, resulting in a flat increase of the marginal tax 
rate from 19 percent to the top rate of 53 percent. Figure 4.1 displays the mar- 
ginal tax rates of the German federal income tax schedule before and after the 
1990 tax reform. 
Marriages are subsidized by a splitting rule that is applied to the tax sched- 
ule outlined above: a married couple filing jointly pays twice the tax on half of 
their joint income. Due to the progressivity of the German income tax sched- 
ule, this results in substantial tax savings relative to two single earners if the 
individuals have different  income^.^ 
As mentioned, this tax schedule is to be applied to the sum of income from 
all sources. Mainly for technical reasons, German tax law distinguishes among 
4. The maximum subsidy-to  a married couple filing jointly with a single income subject to 
the top marginal tax rate-is  DM 22,842 (U.S. $14,300) per annum. 86  Axel Borsch-Supan 
seven income categories: (1) agricultural income, (2) income from business, 
(3) labor income from self-employment, (4) labor income from employment, 
(5)  income from capital, (6)  rental income, (7) other income, in particular spec- 
ulative capital gains and pensions returns. Not included among these income 
sources and therefore not subject to federal income tax is income in the form 
of gifts, inheritances, and prizes such as those from lotteries. There is, however, 
a special tax for gifts and inheritances, which we will discuss in section 4.2.4. 
Only taxes on labor income from employment and taxes on profit shares are 
withheld at source. All other income has to be declared in the yearly income 
tax  statement. Compared to the United States, less income is withheld  at 
source. The most important difference here is the tax treatment of  interest 
income. 
4.2.1  Interest Income 
Of interest income, the first DM 600 (DM 1,200 for married couples filing 
jointly;  about U.S.  $375, U.S.  $750 for married  couples) is formally tax- 
e~empt.~  This exclusion was originally intended to avoid the taxation of interest 
from insignificant savings but is now  explicitly considered a subsidy to sav- 
ings. Interest income in excess of the exclusion is taxable income. Table 4.11 
presents the estimated tax losses as a result of  this exclusion, from 1975 to 
1990. 
However, the main feature of interest income taxation in Germany is its lax 
enforcement. Interest income from passbook savings or similar liquid capital 
and bonds is currently not subject to automatic withholding but is self-reported 
on the tax return. Direct notification of the internal revenue service by the bank 
(as routinely done in the United States on Form 1099) would be considered a 
violation of German privacy laws. Bankers’ discretion in Germany is almost 
as  sacred as in Switzerland. Hence, interest income remains widely unde- 
clared, and the public does not really share the notion that this constitutes tax 
evasion. 
Two  mechanisms enforce some degree of  interest income taxation. First, 
there is a provision which states that, when land and houses are purchased, the 
sources of payment must be specified. If  these sources include financial assets 
or inheritances, the revenue service routinely cross-checks whether the appro- 
priate income and estate taxes have been paid. There are, of course, obvious 
ways to avoid revealing the primary sources of payment. Second, the German 
internal revenue service freezes all assets of  a deceased person. The estate is 
redistributed to the heirs only after a careful check that all taxes have been paid 
by  the decedent. If  this is not the case, the heirs have to pay the tax liability 
before the estate can be released. 
Five years ago the government tried to introduce automatic withholding of 
5.  This amount is called the Sparer-Freihetrag. It is to increase 10-fold, when automatic with- 
holding is reintroduced (see below). 87  Savings in Germany-Part  1: Incentives 
interest income taxes (Quellensteuer) at a rate of  10 percent. This rule was 
heavily opposed and induced substantial flows of capital from German banks 
to banks in neighboring countries such as Luxembourg. It ultimately led to the 
demission of the secretary of finance and a repeal of the withholding rule only 
half a year later (Nohrbd and Raab 1990). 
However, in 1991 the German supreme court issued a decision that the gov- 
ernment must take action to enforce equal taxation of all income sources. In 
response to this, the government has stepped up its public relations effort to 
stimulate compliance with the tax code but has been reluctant to change the 
privacy laws that might enable enforcement. Moreover, it will revive withhold- 
ing taxes on interest at source, now at a rate of 30 percent, beginning in 1993. 
However, this only appears to be a dramatic change. In fact. the government 
will increase the interest income exclusion tenfold to DM 6,000 (DM 12,000 
for married couples filing jointly; about U.S. $3,750, U.S. $7,500 for married 
couples). Hence, the reform will continue to shield most interest income from 
taxation, with the exception of income of the very rich. Because the tax liability 
will be transferred as a lump sum from each bank with no possibility for the 
internal revenue service to trace each individual taxpayer, the very rich can still 
cheat on the difference between the withholding tax of 30 percent and the, 
presumably higher, marginal tax rate applicable to them. 
Somewhat of a counterpart to the lax taxation of interest income is the non- 
deductibility of interest expenditures for any kind of consumer loan. In particu- 
lar, German consumers cannot deduct mortgage interest on land and housing 
purchases, an important deductible item in the United States.6 Interest pay- 
ments are deductible only if they can be considered business expenses. The 
most important example here is mortgage interest related to a dwelling that is 
rented to somebody else. 
The symmetry between lax taxation of interest received and no deduction 
for interest paid is not a statutory one. In fact, while interest income ought to 
be taxed by law, the law also explicitly forbids the deduction of consumption 
and mortgage interest payments. 
4.2.2  Dividends and Corporate Income Taxes 
Income from dividends and other kinds of profit shares is, in general, subject 
to automatic withholding at a rate of 25 percent, which is then credited against 
the actual income tax burden. There is no exclusion for dividend income, un- 
like interest income. Thus, a rule is applied to dividend income that was politi- 
cally infeasible for interest income. 
In addition, dividends are subject to corporate income tax (Korperschaft- 
steuer) at a flat rate of  36 percent. However, this tax too is credited against 
6. Temporary and restricted exceptions were in place in  1986-89 and  1992-1994.  The current 
exception allows for the deductability of  mortgage interest up to  DM  12,000 (U.S. $7,500) per 
annum for three consecutive years after buying a newly built house. 88  Axel Borsch-Supan 
personal income taxes. Hence, Germany has no double taxation of  dividend 
income as in the United States. 
Because it can be deducted from personal income tax, the German corporate 
income tax is in essence not a separate tax. Effectively, corporate profits- 
unless they are retained earnings-are  taxed at the applicable marginal income 
tax rates of the corporation’s owners, in proportion to their ownership shares. 
Retained earnings are treated very differently. They are taxed at a flat 50 
percent at the company level and cannot be credited against the personal in- 
come taxes of the shareholders. 
4.2.3  Capital Gains 
The taxation of capital gains in Germany deviates from the Anglo-Saxon 
principle of a specific, often complicated capital gains tax. In fact, capital taxa- 
tion of households in Germany is very simple.’ 
Capital gains are subject to personal taxation only when they are obtained 
by  what the law considers speculation. Speculation is defined as selling a fi- 
nancial asset (e.g., bonds) within six months of  the purchase date, or selling 
land or land leases within two years of the purchase date. In these cases, capital 
gains are computed as the nominal difference between actual sales price and 
actual purchase price, reduced by associated transaction outlays. This amount 
is then taxed as ordinary income. If  capital is held longer than six months (or 
two years, in the case of land) capital gains are not taxed. 
In addition, the first DM 1,000 (about U.S. $625) of  capital gains are tax- 
exempt in all cases. Capital gains of  one asset and capital losses of  another 
asset within a given calender year can be consolidated. 
Income achieved by  investing in a pension scheme is also only partially 
taxed. German tax law distinguishes between the insurance part of  pension 
income and the internal return of a pension scheme. The share of the second 
part is tabulated by  age at retirement. These tables are computed as imputed 
interest earned on fictitious pension wealth based on an annuity rule that under- 
estimates the actuarial fair accrual and ignores the intergenerational redistribu- 
tion between contributions and pensions. For a worker retiring at age 65, the 
assumed internal return of his pension investment amounts to 24 percent of 
annual pension income. This part is taxable as ordinary income. Because of 
the actuarially unfair computation and the omission of transfer gains, pension 
income is effectively taxed at a substantially lower rate than ordinary income. 
4.2.4  Gift and Estate Tax 
Capital transfers in the form of gifts and inheritances are not subject to Ger- 
man federal income tax but to a specific gift and inheritance tax (Schenkung- 
and Erbschufsteuer). Bequests and inter vivos gifts are taxed at the same statu- 
tory rate. This should in theory eliminate distortions between inter vivos gifts 
7. Tax treatment of capital gains at the company level is different. 89  Savings in Germany-Part  1 : Incentives 
and bequests. In fact, however, taxation is a disincentive to leave bequests 
because it is much easier to evade taxation by  transfemng wealth while still 
alive, while German law requires the freezing of all assets as soon as a person 
dies. 
Tax  rates and initial exclusions depend on one’s relation to the donor (see 
table 4.4).8 Spouses and  children  are  allowed very  large exclusions (DM 
250,000 and DM 90,000, respectively; about U.S. $150,000 and U.S. $56,000, 
respectively) and subject to low tax rates (3-35  percent: e.g., 4 percent for 
DM 100,000 and 10 percent for DM l,OOO,OOO),  while nonrelatives face a low 
exclusion (DM 5,000) and high tax rates (20-70  percent: e.g., 24 percent for 
DM 100,000 and 48 percent for DM 1,000,000).  Because real estate is valued 
at assessed values, which are very low, substantial estates remain tax-free. 
4.3  Property and Transaction Taxes 
Property taxes play a minor role in the German tax system except for the 
very wealthy. In contrast to those in the United States, they have little effect on 
middle-class taxpayers on the one hand and are only a minor source of revenue 
for local governments on the other. 
The German system has two kinds of property taxes: a general property tax 
on  all  asset types  (Vermugensteuer), which  is uniform  across Germany- 
though technically a state tax-and  a local property tax on land, which differs 
among communities (Grundsteuer A und B). 
4.3.1  State Property Taxes 
State property taxes are due on net wealth, that is, the sum of all assets minus 
debt. The tax base is total net wealth at the beginning of each calender year, 
reduced by  an exclusion of, normally, DM 70,000 per  household member 
(about U.S. $44,000). A proportional tax rate of 0.5 percent is applied to the 
tax base. In addition, corporations pay another 0.6 percent state property tax, 
nonrefundable to owners. 
Computation of  total wealth is regulated by  a special evaluation law  (Be- 
wertungsgesetz).  This law defines the value of financial assets as basically their 
current market value and the value of real property as basically their assessed 
value. The law also specifies assessment rules. These rules result effectively in 
assessed values for land and housing that are on average about one-seventh of 
actual sales values (Schoffel 1986). However, this ratio varies both between 
and within communities. Assessed values are updated every six years for land 
and housing, and every three years for business property. The updating proce- 
dure is commonly not a property-specific but a universal adaptation of prop- 
8. This is quite different from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. See Richter 
(1987). 90  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 4.4  Gift and Inheritance Tax Rates (%) 
Relationship Category 
Taxable Wealth 












































































11  20 
12.5  22 
14  24 
1.5.5  26 
17  28 
18.5  30 
20  32 
21.5  34 
23  36 
24.5  38 
26  40 
27.5  42 
29  44 
30.5  46 
32  48 
34  50 
36  52 
38  54 
40  56 
43  58 
46  60 
50  62 
55  64 
60  67 
65  70 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Erbschaft- and Schenkungsteuergesetz. 
Note: The relationship categories and, in parentheses, their corresponding tax-free exclusions are 
as follows: I-spouses  and children (spouses: DM 250,000,  children: DM 90,000 plus supple- 
ments for minors), 11-grandchildren  (DM 50,000),  111-parents  and siblings (DM lO,OOO),  IV- 
everybody else (DM 3,000). 
erty values to general increases in land and housing prices. The last major 
individual reassessment was in 1964. 
The combination of large exclusions and small assessment ratios render the 
state property taxes fairly irrelevant for all but the very wealthy. For a three- 
person household with no other wealth, for example, the sales value of a house 
must be larger than DM 1.5 million (about U.S. $900,000) to be subject to the 
state property tax. Moreover, a small amount of financial debt is sufficient to 
offset great real estate wealth, resulting in zero taxable net ~ealth.~ 
9. The amount of  financial debt necessary to wipe out property taxes is the assessment ratio 
times real estate wealth. 91  Savings in Germany-Part  1: Incentives 
4.3.2  Local Property Taxes 
Local property taxes are due on land only. While assessed values are the 
same as for state property taxes, tax rates are set by communities. Variation 
across communities, however, is relatively small, particularly in comparison to 
the variation among communities in the United States. Effective tax rates vary 
by land usage. Land for housing is effectively taxed at rates between 0.15 and 
0.2 percent of market value, rates much lower than in the United States. 
Because of  the small tax burden, the problem of differential effective taxa- 
tion due to different assessment ratios and the resulting call for reassessment 
are not political issues in Germany. 
4.3.3  Transaction Taxes 
Transaction taxes were levied when stocks, companies, and land were sold. 
With the exception of  that on land transactions, these taxes have been abol- 
ished. The former transaction tax on the sale of stocks (Biirsenumsatzsteuer) 
was  1 per mill of the sales value for the seller as well as for the buyer. It was 
abolished effective January 1, 1991. The former transaction tax on the sale of 
companies (Gesellschaftsteuer) was 1 percent of the sales value for the seller. 
This tax was abolished effective January 1, 1992. Finally, the transaction tax 
on the sale of  land (Grundenverbsteuer)  is 2 percent of the assessed value. 
This tax is still being levied on the buyers of land. 
4.4  Pension Plans and Retirement Saving 
Germany has a pay-as-you-go public pension system, which supplies, in ef- 
fect, a minimum level of retirement income to almost every worker. Coverage 
is very broad. Only the self-employed (8.9 percent of the labor force in 1988) 
and workers with very small incomes (5.6 percent) are not required to partici- 
pate, although they may do so (Casmir 1989). 
However, the basic principle of the German retirement system is not the 
provision of  a last-resort retirement income but the appropriate replacement 
of individual lifetime income. The German public retirement system is more 
insurance than a social safety net or transfer program, which is reflected in 
the name Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung (mandatory retirement insurance) as 
opposed to “Social Security” in the United States. Private pensions, either on 
an individual or a firm-based level, are therefore much rarer than in countries 
with a less pronounced link between individual labor and retirement income. 
4.4.1 
Until 1992, public pension benefits were computed by a formula in which, 
in principle, number of years of service, current wage level, and relative former 
income position of the individual worker entered multiplicatively. This resulted 
in three features: pension benefits were only slightly affected by  retirement 
The German Public Pension System 92  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 4.5  Net Replacement Ratios of Social Security Old-Age Pensionsd 
Relative Income 







61  67 
55  66 
53  71 
45  77 
41  75 
30  53 
Source: Casmir (1989,508,512). 
”Net  replacement ratios for a worker with 40 years of service. Married-couple supplement not in- 
cluded. 
bWages  of an “average production worker” according to the OECD. 
age, pensioners benefited from labor productivity increases achieved by  the 
younger generation, and, even more important for savings, pension income for 
the middle class was roughly proportional to labor income and thus conserved 
relative income positions even after retirement. Because the lifetime income 
base had a lower and an upper limit, this proportionality holds only roughly. 
The system was reformed in 1992, but essentially retains these features, ex- 
cept that the relation between pension benefits and retirement age is more actu- 
arially fair. In addition, the link between pension benefits and current wages 
was changed from a before-tax to an after-tax basis.’” 
The philosophical difference between this and other pension systems, most 
notably the U.S. Social Security system-the  German system is not designed 
to prevent poverty but to provide approximately the same living standard be- 
fore and after retirement-results  in  substantially higher replacement rates 
than, for example, the U.S. Social Security system, particularly for higher in- 
come levels. As a matter of  fact, the rationale for not having a 100 percent 
replacement ratio in Germany is not the added utility of leisure but the cessa- 
tion of work-related expenses after retirement. 
Table 4.5 presents net replacement ratios by income class, that is, after-tax 
retirement incomes as percentages of  the preceding after-tax labor incomes. 
On average, German social security income is about 33 percent higher than 
American, resulting in  an  average net  replacement ratio  of  more than  70 
percent. 
Payments to the retirement insurance program are directly subtracted from 
wages, similar to Social Security contributions in the United States. The cur- 
rent contribution rate is 17.7 percent on the first DM 6,800 of gross monthly 
earnings, shared equally between employer and employee (about U.S. $5 1,000 
10. More precisely, “before” and “after” mean before and after personal income taxes and social 
security contributions. 93  Savings in Germany-Part  1: Incentives 
per annum), a low point between the 18.7 percent rate in 1980 and the expected 
increase to 20.1 percent in 2000, and even higher thereafter. Even so, the Ger- 
man contribution rate is perceptibly higher than the contribution rate in the 
United States, due partly to the higher replacement ratio and partly to the dif- 
ferent age structure of the German population. 
German public retirement insurance is augmented by  mandatory accident 
insurance, an institution close to a combination of  disability insurance and 
workers' compensation in the United States. Every employee, except for civil 
servants, is enrolled in this branch of  the German social insurance system. 
Accident insurance covers on-the-job accidents and provides compensation, 
full or partial pensions in case of accident-related early retirement, and pen- 
sions for widows and widowers in case of  accident-related death. Contribu- 
tions are paid exclusively by  employers. 
4.4.2  Employer-provided Pension Plans 
Employer-provided private pensions play  only  a minor role in Germany. 
They provide approximately 3 percent of the retirement income of the German 
elderly. In 1984,82 percent of all elderly in West Germany received only social 
security income. Another 8.5 percent had additional private pension income 
(mainly annuities from life insurance), and only 7.6 percent had both social 
security and firm pension income (Borsch-Supan 1992a). This is in stark con- 
trast to the United States, where employer-provided pensions provide a sig- 
nificant fraction of retirement income (about 15 percent of American retire- 
ment  income). About half  of  Americans age 60 and older are covered by 
pension plans. For 13 percent of these, pensions contribute more than 20 per- 
cent of their retirement incomes; for 2 percent, pensions make up more than 
half (Hurd 1989, table I1 6). 
Contributions are treated as taxable income for the employee, but there are 
tax  incentives for employer-provided pension plans on the employers'  side, 
because pension funds can escape corporate income taxation in certain circum- 
stances when they are used as reserves. This is relevant mainly for large com- 
panies. 
4.5  Health Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, and Precautionary 
Saving 
Germany has a considerably tighter social safety net than the United States. 
Health insurance is mandatory, and unemployment compensation can last up 
to two years." One is tempted to conclude that Germans need precautionary 
savings less than Americans. 
11. Extensive descriptions of the German social policy system are contained in French (1987) 
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4.5.1  Health Insurance 
In Germany, virtually every worker is enrolled in the health insurance sys- 
tem, which covers all health expenditures, the only exception being long-term 
institutionalized care not related to acute illness. Coverage includes hospital 
costs, costs of doctor visits, and medication and medical aids. It covers expen- 
ditures not only for catastrophic illnesses but also for many bagatelles (over- 
the-counter medicines), and until recently even cold remedies.'* Therefore, 
German coverage is far more comprehensive than that of the U.S. Medicaid 
and Medicare systems. 
Germany has a dual health insurance system, partly private, partly social. 
The social health insurance system is not like the British National Health Ser- 
vice. Rather, it consists of  several heavily regulated insurance companies- 
some public, some private-that  engage in limited competition. Enrollment in 
the social health insurance system is mandatory for employees with monthly 
incomes below about DM 5,000 (about U.S. $37,500 per annum). Wealthier 
households and self-employed workers are free to choose which insurance to 
enroll in or to self-insure. However, once private insurance has been chosen, 
there is no way back into the social system. Competition in the private sector 
is also limited because government regulations enforce rather high service 
standards and require the redistribution of  surpluses to customers. Although 
social health insurance serves as last-resort insurance because it is required to 
accept every customer initially, there is little adverse selection. The main rea- 
son is, of course, the mandatory participation of all households except upper- 
middle-class and wealthy households. Moreover, standards in the social insur- 
ance system are high, and the system is not considered inferior, unlike, for 
example, the British system. 
Monthly contributions to social health insurance are subtracted from wages, 
like contributions to retirement insurance. Payments are shared equally be- 
tween employer and employee and amount to  12.5 percent of  the first DM 
5,000 (U.S. $3,125) of monthly gross income. 
The only significant gap in the safety net for health expenditures is costs of 
long-term institutionalized care not related to acute illness. The government 
has promised to establish long-term care insurance that would fill this gap by 
1994. After much discussion about a fully funded system, which would be a 
novelty in the German social insurance system, the present coalition govern- 
ment has decided on a pay-as-you-go system, much like the social health insur- 
ance system. It features an initial contribution rate of about 2 percent of gross 
income, shared equally between employer and employee, and would  cover 
most costs of long-term institutionalized care.13 
12. Bagatelle medication is nonrefundable, as of the Gesundheitsreformgesetz (German Health 
13. The contribution rate is likely to increase substantially with the aging of  the German popn- 
Reform) of  1989. 
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4.5.2  Unemployment Insurance 
The third component in the German social insurance system is unemploy- 
ment insurance. All employees must be enrolled; only the self-employed and 
civil servants do not participate. Monthly contributions to unemployment in- 
surance are subtracted from wages, like contributions to health and retirement 
insurance. Payments are shared equally between employer and employee and 
amount to 6.3 percent of monthly gross income. 
In case of unemployment, there are two kinds of payment. During an initial 
period, in general lasting one year, the unemployed worker receives unemploy- 
ment compensation (Arkitslosengeld). The replacement rate is 68 percent of 
net wages for workers with children, 63 percent of net wages for workers with- 
out children. 
After this period, if the worker is still unemployed, he or she is eligible to 
receive unemployment relief for one more year (Arbeitslosenhilfe). This relief 
is much like welfare because it requires the exhaustion of the personal wealth 
of the worker and his immediate family.I4  The replacement rate for unemploy- 
ment relief is 58 percent of net wages for workers with children and 56 percent 
of net wages for workers without children. 
Eligibility rules and the duration of the first period actually depend on years 
of service as well as on age (see table 4.6). In order to receive unemployment 
compensation at all, the worker has to demonstrate a minimum duration of 
service of one year. In this case, unemployment compensation is paid for half 
a year. Each additional four months of service add another two months of un- 
employment compensation, so that a minimum of two years of service is re- 
quired  to  be  eligible  for  one  full  year  of  unemployment  compensation. 
For workers age 42 and  older, this  scheme is continued. At  a maximum, 
workers age 54 and older with at least five years and four months of service 
are eligible to receive two years and eight months of unemployment compensa- 
tion. In  each case, another year of unemployment relief can be added if  the 
worker is eligible. Thus, compared to unemployment insurance in the United 
States, German benefits last substantially longer and feature a higher replace- 
ment rate. 
4.6  Special Incentive Programs 
The German government has several programs that subsidize savings. These 
programs had their heyday in the seventies and early eighties but have recently 
been reduced.  A  general program  designed to  foster wealth  accumulation 
among lower income groups (VermiigensbildungsgesetZ) is a means for wealth 
redistribution.  Several other programs are  incentive programs for  specific 
kinds of savings, most prominently savings in building societies (Bauspurkus- 
sen) and life insurance policies. 
14. This requirement includes parents and own children. Housing wealth is not counted. 96  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 4.6  Duration of Initial Period of Unemployment Compensation 
(weekdays) 
Employment Duration  Age 
Total Number  Years since First 





























156  156  156 
208  208  208 
260  260  260 
312  312  312 
364  364 
416  416 




























Source: Bundesminister fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (1  990). 
4.6.1  Vermogensbildungsgesetz 
The Vermogensbildungsgesetz (wealth accumulation program) was put in 
place in  a rudimentary form in  1961 and substantially extended in  1970. It 
very much exemplifies the German idea of a social market economy. Its stated 
intentions were to at least partially equalize the wealth distribution in order to 
stabilize trust in a market economy, cushion the conflict between  labor and 
capital, and induce savings to provide sufficient capital for economic growth. 
The basic mechanism of the program is as follows: Employees authorize the 
deduction of a certain amount from their pay, which is direct-deposited into 
long-term funds. Originally, the contributions were paid by the employer only. 
Currently, no distinction is made between employer and employee contribu- 
tion. The employer may  not impose the selection of  a particular  fund. The 
funds must remain on deposit for at least six years. If the employee’s income 
is below a certain limit, the government supplements the contributions at a 
fixed percentage until an upper limit is reached. 
Currently, funds eligible for a subsidy include shares in the employee’s own 
or any other company and savings accounts at building ~0cieties.I~  Until re- 
cently, regular long-term savings accounts at banks and contributions to life 
insurance qualified, as well. Currently, contributions of up to DM 936 (roughly 
U.S. $600) for individuals and twice that amount for married couples are subsi- 
15. These are the provisions of the Fiinfres Vermugensbildungsgeserz,  Fassung  1990. 97  Savings in Germany-Part  1: Incentives 
Table 4.7  Premia in the Wealth Accumulation Program 
Subsidy (%) 
General  Productive 
Limit of  Savings  Bausparkussen  Capital 
Contribution 
Year  (DM)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
1975-82  624  30  40  30  40  30  40 
1983-89  936  16  26  23  33  23  33 
1990-92  936  0  0  10  10  20  20 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Vermiigenbildungsgeserz. 
Note: (a) households without children: (b) households with 3 children 
dized. Company shares are currently subsidized by  a 20 percent premium, 
while the subsidization rate is 10 percent for savings accounts at building soci- 
eties. The current income limit for participation in this program is DM 54,000 
per year for married-couple households (about U.S. $33,750), a lower-middle- 
class income in Germany, and half that amount for single-member households. 
In the seventies, these premia were as high as 40 percent, and the income limit 
for eligibility was sufficiently high to cover incomes far into the middle class. 
An overview is provided in table 4.7. 
In addition to the above program, employees can receive shares of their em- 
ployers’ companies as tax-exempt income, if they do not sell these shares for 
six years and if the market value does not exceed DM 500 per annum (about 
U.S.  $312).  There are no income limits to this tax subsidy.16 Estimated govern- 
ment expenditures on these programs are tabulated in table 4.8. 
4.6.2  Bausparkassen 
Savings to accumulate the down payment for housing purchases are subsi- 
dized by  a special incentive program (Wohnungsbaupramiengesetz).  The sys- 
tem centers on the German building societies (Bausparkassen).  Each building 
society is a completely closed and self-financing savings and loan institution 
in which all funds for housing mortgages are taken from savings in the building 
society, and only former savers in the society are eligible for home mortgages. 
This pay-as-you-go system is almost completely detached from the general 
capital market. The combined savings and loan contracts in building societies 
have the following form: Building society and saver agree on a specified con- 
tract sum. The saver accumulates 40 or 50 percent of the contract sum. If this 
amount has been accumulated, the contract is called “mature” and the saver is 
eligible for a mortgage of the remainder amount, 60 or 50 percent of the con- 
tract sum, respectively. Neither the time for the accumulation of  the savings 
nor the time of the payout of the loan are part of the contract. Average accumu- 
16. These are the provisions of  9: 19a of the Einkommensteuergesetz Table 4.8  Government Expenditures in Savings Subsidies, 1975-90  (million DM) 
Total Savings 
General Interest  Premium for  Wealth  Company  Subsidies 
Income  Tax Deduction  Premium for  General  Accumulation  Participation 
Exclusion  Bausparkasse  Bausparkasse  Savings  Program  Program  Nominal  Real 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1975  300  765  3,169  1,633  3,230  0  9,097  14,326 
1976  300  800  2,241  2,508  3,415  0  9,264  13,973 
1977  315  780  1,852  4,367  3,500  0  10,814  15,741 
1978  330  750  1,870  2,390  3,450  0  8,790  12,468 
720  1,926  1,351  3,000  100  7,447  10,132  1979  350 
1980  365  690  1,974  1,270  2,900  100  7,299  9,430 
1981  380  500  1,967  1,408  2,835  70  7,160  8,710 
390  570  1,941  1,692  2,130  70  6,793  7,853  1982 
840  1,076  2,332  1,780  40  6,468  7,235  1983  400 
1984  410  820  938  1,492  1,850  50  5,560  6,070 
1985  425  790  878  1,023  1,790  120  5,026  5,375 
1986  440  640  885  845  1,800  130  4,740  5,075 
1987  455  720  862  532  1,935  200  4,704  5,026 
1988  470  630  842  5  2,040  210  4,197  4,427 
980  0  2,050  225  5,155  5,293  1989  1,300  600 
1990  1,200  320  590  0  1,000  225  3,335  3,335 
Source: Bundesminister der Finanzen (ed.), Subventionsberichte des Deutschen Bundestages (Annual Report of the Ger- 
man Parliament on Subsidies Granted) (Bonn: Heger, 1978-90). 
Note: The associated parts of the German tax code are: (1) $20.4 Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG), (2) $10.1 EStG, (3) 
Wohnungsbaupramiengesetz (WoPG) including state contributions, (4) Sparpramiengesetz (SparPC), (5) $$  13, 15 5th 
Vermogensbildungsgesetz  (5.VermSC) and the corresponding earlier versions, (6) $ 19a EstG and $8 Kapitalerhohungsge- 
setz (KapErhG). Col. (7) is the sum of  cols. (1)  through (6). Col. (8) is col. (7) divided by  the consumer price index, 
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lation time is about six to seven years, and the waiting time between the accu- 
mulation of savings and the payout of the total contract sum (loan and savings) 
can be between one and two years. The waiting time is the crucial mechanism 
used to balance the pay-as-you-go system. The interest paid on savings is very 
low  (currently 3 percent, whereas market interest is about 7.5 percent) but 
so is the mortgage interest (currently 5 percent, whereas market rate is about 
10 percent). 
There are basically three incentives for participation in the system. First, the 
nominal interest differential between loan and savings interest is lower than in 
the market. However, this “incentive” is deceiving because it ignores the time 
structure of the payments. Second, the contract forces households to save, and 
they appear to like this. Although this is not an argument that appeals to econo- 
mists, it appears again and again in surveys that ask people why they partici- 
pate. Finally, the government subsidizes this kind of savings, and the subsidy 
was both deep and widespread until recently. Table 4.9 provides participation 
rates by sociodemographic group. 
The law specifies two kinds of subsidies which are exclusive of each other 
but are on top of  subsidies granted by  the wealth accumulation program de- 
scribed above. The mechanism of the first kind of subsidy is the same as for 
the wealth accumulation program: a percentage premium with a cap for house- 
holds below an  income limit. The second mechanism is independent of  an 
income limit and allows contributions to building societies to be deducted from 
federal income tax. Contributions are implicitly capped by  the provision that 
the deduction not exceed the permissible sum of deductions for what the law 
calls “precautionary expenses” (Vorsorgeaufwendungen). These include con- 
tributions to the social insurance system (health, unemployment, and retire- 
ment insurance) and contributions to private health and life insurance. 
Like the wealth accumulation program, this program was rather generous in 
the seventies and early eighties but recently has been severely cut. Table 4.8 
summarizes the impact of  these changes on estimated government expendi- 
tures. Currently, the premium of the first mechanism is 10 percent of contribu- 
tions up  to DM  1,600 (about U.S. $1,000), and the income limits are DM 
54,000 per year for married-couple households and DM  27,000 for single- 
member households, exactly as for the wealth accumulation program. The sub- 
sidization rate was in excess of 40 percent in the mid-seventies. Subsidies have 
since dramatically decreased, see table 4.10. 
The viability of  the second mechanism has been severely hampered by  a 
deduction limit for precautionary expenses that has not been changed in spite 
of  substantially increased contributions, particularly to health insurance pay- 
ments. In many cases, health insurance payments alone have crowded out the 
possibility of deducting contributions to building societies. Moreover, after the 
1990 tax reform, only 50 percent of contributions to building societies can be 
deducted. Table 4.8 shows the impact on tax expenditures. 
A similar incentive program existed for general long-term savings, the Spar- Table 4.9  Participation in the Buuspurkussen Program, Contributions, and 
Percentage of Financial Wealth in Bausparkussen Accounts. 
Participation (%) 
Demographic 
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Source: Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 1978 and 1983, quoted from Borsch-Supan and 
Stahl (1991) 
Note: “Participation” is the percentage of households with Bausparkassen contracts in the corre- 
sponding household group. “Contribution” is the average annual contribution of households in the 
program. “Wealth share” is the average percentage of financial net wealth held in Bausparkussen 
contracts among participating households. “Income” is nominal monthly net household income. 101  Savings in Germany-Part  I: Incentives 
Table 4.10  Subsidies in the Buuspurkassen Program 
First Mechanism:  Second Mechanism: 
Year  Premium (%)  Tax Deduction (%) 
I975  23 + 2 for each child  100 
1976-8 1  18 + 2 for each child  100 
1982-89  14 + 2 for each child  100 
1990  10  50 
~~ 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Wohnungsbaupramiengesetz. 
priimierzgesetz. However, it was removed in 1990. Together, the special incen- 
tive programs and the general wealth accumulation program have historically 
provided a substantial subsidy to saving. Table 4.11 presents some illustrative 
examples for the  1988-89  fiscal years, before the  1990 tax reform severely 
reduced the subsidies. 
4.6.3  Life Insurance 
Savings in the form of  contributions to life insurance funds are subsidized 
because they can be deducted from federal income taxes. However, the same 
implicit cap exists as in the second mechanism used to subsidize contributions 
to building societies: the deduction must not exceed the permissible total of all 
precautionary expenses. The internal returns from investing in a life insurance 
system escape taxation, much like the returns from a pension scheme. This is 
very much like the tax treatment of life insurance contributions in the United 
States. 
4.7  Conclusions 
Capital markets per se do not differ greatly between the United States and 
Germany. In the two countries, financial markets are only mildly regulated, 
and portfolio options are quite comparable. The only difference may be that 
the wealthy in the United States face more portfolio options due to a somewhat 
more dynamic market for financial instruments than their German counter- 
parts. Policy-induced differences in savings options between Germany and the 
United States include mainly different dedicated savings programs. In  the 
United States, IRAs and Keoghs are subsidized savings dedicated to retirement 
income. In Germany, bequeathable savings dedicated to housing investments 
and company shares have been substantially subsidized and still play a major 
role in private wealth accumulation. 
If  we sum up the incentives for savings in Germany and the extent of Ger- 
man social safety provisions, we receive a mixed message about the impact of 
public policy on savings. On one hand, tax treatment of savings is more favor- 
able in Germany than in the United States, which should, ceteris paribus, in- 
duce relatively higher savings rates in Germany. On the other hand, two of 102  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 4.11  Examples for Total Savings Subsidy 
Total 
Bausparkassen Savings  General Savings  Subsidy 
Total  ___ 
Premium  hemiurn Subsidized 
Maximum  ~  Maximum -  Savings 
Household Type  Contribution  %  DM  Contribution  %  DM  DM  DM  % 
Single, no children 
Married, no children, 
Married, no children, 
Married, two children, 
Married, two children, 
Married, three children. 







Married, one earner 











14  112  624 
14  224  624 
14  224  1,248 
18  288  624 
18  288  1,248 
20  320  624 
20  320  1,248 
1992 
10  160  936 
10  160  1,872 
23  144 
23  144 
23  287 
23  144 
23  287 
33  412 
33  412 
10  94 










256  17.9 
368  16.5 
511  17.9 
432  19.4 
575  20.2 
526  23.6 
732  25.7 
254  10.0 
347  10.0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Wohnungsbaupramiengesetz,  Sparpramiengesetz. and Vermo- 
gensbildungsgesetz. 
the main economic rationales for saving-assuring  a comfortable retirement 
income and precaution against high health-care expenses-are  less impor- 
tant in Germany than they are in the United States because the safety net is 
tighter in Germany. This should, ceteris paribus, reduce savings among house- 
holds below retirement age.I7 Among the older elderly, however, the tighter 
safety net in Germany might actually increase net savings since the generous 
retirement income might not only prevent the German elderly from depleting 
their assets but even provide income levels sufficiently large to induce savings 
in old age (Borsch-Supan 1992b). 
In order to gauge the impact of the incentive programs on one side and of 
the tight safety net on the other, we need to know the elasticity of  savings 
with respect to after-tax returns, as well as the substitution elasticities among 
different kinds of savings, including especially the substitution between private 
17. That is, provided the young generation believes in the stability of  the current pension system 
in spite of the dramatic aging of the German population. 103  Savings in Germany-Part  1: Incentives 
and public savings. Borsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) provide evidence that the 
special incentive program favoring saving in building societies had a positive 
net impact on total savings, i.e., new savings in building societies more than 
compensated for substitution out of general savings. Similarly, tabulations of 
household  wealth  in  comparable data  sets indicate that  private  household 
wealth is about 20 percent lower in Germany than in the United States. How- 
ever, imputed social security wealth is about 33 percent higher in Germany 
(Borsch-Supan 199  la). Again, although there is some substitution, the total 
wealth effect is positive. 
Finally, it is important to note that savings incentives in Germany have dra- 
matically changed since the mid-eighties. While the favorable incentive pro- 
grams are still in place and capital income frequently escapes taxation, many 
of  the subsidies have been severely reduced, in particular since the 1990 tax 
reform. See table 4.8, which summarizes this. It is too early to observe changes 
in savings behavior. And, in fact, the aggregate savings rate went up from 1985 
to 1989 in spite of a reduction in tax incentives. 
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